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STUDENT ARTICLES
INCREASED PRESS ACCESS TO INFORMATION-
LIMITING THE RANGE OF GOVERNMENT
CLASSIFICATION
THEODORE F. KOMMERS*
INTRODUCTION
An analysis of government secrecy in the United States
shows that the present information classification process
results in vast amounts of information being kept from public
view without proper justification. Government secrecy is prob-
lematic in a democratic society where public policy and law-
making decisions are made by the people through elected rep-
resentatives. In such a system, the public and their elected rep-
resentatives should be thoroughly informed about their
government and the world to make responsible and knowl-
edgeable decisions. Intelligent decisionmaking by the people
is handicapped to the extent that the government withholds
relevant information. The resolution to the precarious balance
between the public's need for information and the nation's
need for security through secrecy is reflected in a proposed
reformation of the classification regulations, which seeks to
limit the types of information which may be classified and to
incorporate specific procedures for the mandatory declassifica-
tion of information.
This essay first addresses a democracy's need for an
unrestricted flow of information. Next, balanced against that
need, the government's responsibility and desire to protect the
nation are set forth. This section points out that attaining even
a minimal level of national security mandates that some infor-
mation (for example, information concerning nuclear weapons)
not be publicly disclosed. The executive is primarily responsi-
ble for national security and foreign affairs, and consequently is
* B.A., 1988 University of Notre Dame; J.D. Candidate, 1992, Notre
Dame Law School; Thos. J. White Scholar 1990-92.
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the branch of government with the authority to classify infor-
mation. There is evidence that this authority to classify has
been abused. The last section offers some proposals for statu-
tory reform of the classification process.
I. THE CONFLICT: DEMOCRACY V. SECRECY
A. Public Information Is Essential to a Democratic Institution
When the founding fathers formed the United States, they
did so to rid themselves of the oppressive British monarchy and
to set up a republic where they could effectively rule them-
selves and control their own lives.' The founders structured
their democratic government so that "the people" would com-
pose and run the government.' They set up an infrastructure
of electoral representation where those elected would be held
accountable to the voters primarily through the ballot box.
The purpose of such a system was to ensure that the collective
citizenry,- through their elected representatives, would make
the policy decisions for the country and avoid having the laws
dictated to them by an unaccountable government.4 The peo-
ple would make decisions about current issues and, ideally,
have these decisions put into action by voting and otherwise
petitioning the government.
For this republic to be run "by the people," citizens must
be effectively included in the decisionmaking process of gov-
ernment. Effective inclusion mandates that the people are
1. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. The preamble to the Constitution most clearly reflects the intentions
of the framers to set up a government where "the People" would be self-
governed.
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for United States of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
"It is ordained that all authority to exercise control, to determine com-
mon action, belongs to 'We the People.' We and we alone, are the rulers."
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION To SELF-GOVERN-
MENT 15 (1948).
3. However, it should be noted that the founders considered
"collective citizenry" to mean white, male landowners.
4. "The Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of both the need
to defend a new nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial
governments, sought to give this new society strength and security by
providing that freedom of speech [and] press . . . should not be abridged."
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (197 1) (per curiam)
(Black, J., concurring).
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thoroughly aware of all sides of the relevant issues of the day as
well as what the current government is doing about them.5 An
informed public is unquestionably a prerequisite to the proper
functioning of a government which is of and for the people. In
New York Times v. United States (the Pentagon Papers case), Justice
Black reaffirmed the need for an informed people. "The Gov-
ernment's power to censor the press was abolished so that the
press would remain forever free to censure the Government.
The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of gov-
ernment and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained
press can effectively expose deception in government." 6 If
people are not made aware of information about the issues fac-
ing government and what the government is doing about them,
one of two unattractive situations will arise. Either the unin-
formed public will make bad decisions or the decisions will be
made by a defacto privileged oligarchy. In the absence of infor-
mation about issues facing the government, the people are dis-
placed from their role as self-governors.7  "Secrecy in
government is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating
bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public
issues are vital to our national health. On public questions
there should be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate.''8
When access to information is lost, self-government is
impossible.
5. "The welfare of the community requires that those who decide issues
shall understand them. They must know what they are voting about. And
this, in turn, requires that ... all facts and interests relevant to the problem
shall be fully and fairly presented to the [public]." MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 2,
at 25. "Without available information, the people cannot determine which
officials they should elect or judge their performance in office. -Abuses of
power, if undiscovered, can never be corrected at the.ballot box." Frank B.
Cross & Stephen M. Griffin, A. Right of Press Access to United States Military
Operations, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 989, 1008 (1987).
6. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (per
curiam) (Black, J., concurring).
7. "As increasing numbers of important decisions are made on the
basis of information to which the public is denied access, the accountability of
elected officials declines, the distance between the governed and their
servants grows ever larger, and our nation becomes less and less 'secure.' "
James A. Goldston et al., Note, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to
Information, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 451 (1986).
8. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (per
curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964)).
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B. National Security Requires Government Secrecy
As much as the free flow of information is vital to the
health of a democratic republic, so too is national security vital
to the very existence of those democratic institutions which
give life to that republic. The executive is primarily responsi-
ble for national security.9 National security relies on the wise
conduct of foreign affairs, the availability of intelligence infor-
mation, and military preparedness-all things controlled by the
executive. Secrecy in these areas is indispensable to their suc-
cess. The need for secrecy in government has been recognized
since the inception of the Constitution. "From our national
beginnings, the Government of the United States has asserted
the right to conceal and, therefore, in practical effect not to let
the people know. Secrecy governed the deliberations in Phila-
delphia in 1787."' 0° From its inception, the United States Con-
gress has thought it necessary for the executive to have the
ability to keep information secret."
As governments have become more complex and weapons
of mass destruction have become more accurate and powerful,
our government's ability to keep information from potential
adversaries has become more and more crucial.' 2 The impor-
tance of secrecy to national security has been recognized in the
Supreme Court: "[T]he maintenance of an effective national
defense require[s] both confidentiality and secrecy .... In the
9. Chief Judge Haynsworth of the Fourth Circuit wrote "The
Constitution in Article II Sec. 2 confers broad powers upon the President in
the conduct of relations with foreign states and in the conduct of the national
defense." United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1063 (1972).
10. Id. at 1316 (quoting Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to
Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 273-74
(1971)). " 'The Federalist' vindicated the right of the executive branch to
conduct negotiations and, by inference, intelligence operations, without any
immediate obligation to supply Congress or the people the detail of what it
was doing." Arthur Schlesinger, The Secrecy Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
1972 (Magazine), at 12.
11. See June D. W. Kalijarvi & Don Wallace, Jr., Executive Authority to
Impose Prior Restraint upon Publication of Information Concerning National Security
Affairs: A Constitutional Power, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 468, 481 (1973). "It also
should be noted that in 1789, the Executive by statute was empowered to
classify government documents and conceal them from the public." Id. at
481-82 n.59.
12. See generally Note, Plugging the Leak: The Case for a Legislative Resolution
of the Conflict Between the Demands of Secrecy and the Need for an Open Government,
71 VA. L. REV. 801, 823-29 (1985).
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area of basic national defense the frequent need for absolute
secrecy is, of course, self-evident."'"
II. EXCLUSIVE EXECUTIVE CONTROL OVER THE
CLASSIFICATION PROCESS
The need for secrecy in government affairs is most impor-
tant in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs. Pursu-
ant to this need, the executive's role as Commander-in-Chief' 4
and as the country's principal agent in foreign relations' 5 has
given him the authority to determine what information shall be
classified.
13. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (per
curiam) (Stewart, J., concurring).
14. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into
actual Service of the United States .. " U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. In The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862), the Supreme Court analyzed the
President's powers as commander-in-chief and gave that role substantial
deference in light of the blockade of the Southern states ordered by President
Lincoln without Congress' approval.
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-
Chief, in suppressing an insurrection has met with such armed
hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as
will compel him to afford to them the character of belligerents, is a
question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by
the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government
to which this power was entrusted. "He must determine what
degree of force the crisis demands."
Id. at 670 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
15. The Supreme Court most strongly reaffirmed the President's role
as the leader in foreign affairs in an opinion written by Justice Sutherland in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), Writing for the
majority, Justice Sutherland said:
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international
relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious embarrassment-is to
be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional
legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and
inquiry within the international field must often accord to the
President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs
alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better
opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of
diplomatic, consular and other officials. Secrecy in respect of
information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the
premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.
Id. at 320-21.
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Today, although various intelligence oversight committees
exist,' 6 the executive has virtually complete and unreviewable
discretion as to what information is classified and kept from the
public. The origin of the executive's daunting power to classify
information stems simply from legislative inaction rather than
from any affirmative specific statutory or Constitutional author-
ity. Executive Order No. 10,290," 7 signed by President Tru-
man in 1951, was the first executive order dealing with
classification of information which stated outright that the
power to classify was not based upon legislation.'" Regarding
President Eisenhower's subsequent order on classification,
Executive Order No. 10,501, the Commission on Government
Security stated: "In the absence of any law to the contrary,
there is an adequate constitutional and statutory basis upon
which to predicate the Presidential authority to issue Executive
Order 10,501."'" Executive Order No. 12,356,20 issued by
President Reagan in 1982, is the order under which informa-
tion is classified today. Generally, the Order outlines the classi-
fication categories, and defines which government officials have
16. The Information Security Oversight Office, created by Executive
Order No. 12,356, mainly collects statistical data rather than reviews the
propriety or legality of executive classification processes. The other
oversight mechanisms, in addition to the congressional committees, include:
(i) the Offices of General Counsel and Inspector General within the
intelligence agencies' (ii) the system of internal regulations
established under the President's Executive Order on Intelligence
and administered through implementing regulations of the
intelligence agencies; (iii) the Office of Intelligence Policy within the
Department ofJustice; (iv) the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
and the court established thereunder . . . and (vi) the National
Security Council or its staff and other nonintelligence departments
and agencies [which review certain intelligence activities]....
Daniel B. Silver, The Uses and Misuses of Intelligence Oversight, 11 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 7, 15-16 (1988).
17. 16 Fed. Reg. 9795 (1951).
18. Executive Order No. 10,290 [ was the first to indicate that the
President was relying not upon any specific statutory provision, but
rather upon "authority vested in me by the Constitution and
statutes, and as President of the United States." Such reliance upon
implied constitutional powers seemed to strengthen the President's
discretion to make official secrecy policy by intertwining his
responsibility as Commander in Chief with the obligation to "take
Care that the Laws by faithfully executed."
STEPHEN DvcuS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 555 (1990) (quoting Richard
C. Ehlke & Harold C. Relyea, The Reagan Administration Order on Security Classifi-
cation: A Critical Assessment, 30 FED. BAR NEWS &J. 91, 92 (1983)).
19. Arthur Schlesinger, The Secrecy Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1972
(Magazine), at 13.
20. 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874, 14,876 (1982).
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original classification authority and on what levels.2 ' Essen-
tially, the authority to classify information is delegated
throughout the executive branch to the heads of the executive
agencies and to top military officials.
Today, it is generally accepted that although widespread
knowledge of government and its activities is essential to a
democracy's legitimacy, a certain amount of secrecy is unavoid-
21. Executive Order No. 12,356 first lays out classification levels and
then lists those individuals who may exercise classification authority.
SECTION 1.1. CLASSIFICATION LEVELS.
(a) National security information (hereinafter "classified
information") shall be classified at one of the following three
levels.
(1) "Top Secret" shall be applied to information, the
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be
expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
national security.
(2) "Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized
disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause
serious damage to the national security..
(3) "Confidential" shall be applied to information, the
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be
expected to cause damage to the national security.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall
be used to identify classified information. ...
SEC. 1.2. CLASSIFICATION AuTHORITY.
(A) Top SECRET. The authority to classify information originally
as Top Secret may be exercised only by:
(1) the President;
(2) agency heads and officials designated by the President in
the Federal Register; and
(3) officials delegated this authority pursuant' to Section
1.2(d).
(B) SECRET. The authority to classify information originally as
Secret may be exercised only by:
(1) agency heads and officials designated by the President in
the Federal Register;
(2) officials with original Top Secret classification authority;
and
(3) officials delegated Such authority pursuant to Section
1.2(d).
(C) CONFIDENTIAL. The authority to classify information origi-
nally as Confidential may be exercised only by:
(1) agency heads and officials designated by the President in
the Federal Register;
(2) officials with original Top Secret or Secret classification
authority; and
(3) officials delegated such authority pursuant to Section
1.2(d)....
Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982).
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able in order for the government to operate effectively.22 A
problem arises with the classification system, though, because
the authority to keep information confidential has been abused.
The Congressional Committee on Government Operations
analyzed President Reagan's Executive Order and found the
following:
The Committee finds that abuse of classification author-
ity and overclassification of government information con-
tinues to be a serious problem. Overclassification results
in unnecessary restrictions on the public availability of
information, a reduction in public confidence in the clas-
sification system, a weakening of the protection for infor-
mation that is truly sensitive, and an increase in the cost
of government.
The Committee finds that Executive Order 12356
offers nothing that will address the problems of overclas-
sification. Unless new action is taken to control overclas-
sification, the new order is likely to make matters worse
because it gives classifiers vaguer guidelines, fewer
restrictions, and unnecessary additional classification
authority.2"
The abuses in government secrecy result from the classifi-
cation process itself in which decisions concerning what infor-
mation should be classified are left entirely up to the executive
and its agencies. Due to the tremendous power and influence
the government has in nearly every facet of life, the potential
for abuse through withholding information is unparalleled. 24
This potential is compounded by the fact that the agencies and
individuals making the classification decisions have an enor-
mous self-serving interest in classifying as much information as
possible.25 As more information is classified, the executive's
22. The introductory paragraph of Executive Order No. 12,356 puts it
best: "[This Order] recognizes that it is essential that the public be informed
concerning the activities of its Government, but that the interests of the
United States and its citizens require that certain information concerning the
national defense and foreign relations be protected against unauthorized
disclosure." Id.
23. Security Classification Policy and Executive Order 12356, 29th Report,
Committee on Government Operations, Aug. 12, 1982, H. Report 97-731.
24. "Numerous independent studies of the classification system have
concluded that far more information is classified than is necessary or
constitutionally permissible." James A. Goldston et al., Note, A Nation Less
Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409,
483-84 n.376 (1986).
25. "Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the
professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and their intentions
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power increases 26 while its accountability to those it was cre-
ated to serve decreases.27
The lowest classification level under the current executive
order mandates that "[information may not be classified under
this Order unless its disclosure reasonably could be expected
to cause damage to the national security. "28 However, this
standard is not followed. Indications that the classification sys-
tem is, in fact, abused are widespread.
In 1972, The New York Times reported that William G. Flo-
rence, a retired Pentagon security officer, testified that he "esti-
mated that the Pentagon files contained about 20 million
classified documents and that 'the disclosure of information in
at least 99.5 per cent of those classified documents could not
be prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation.' "29
Regarding the Vietnam War, it is now known that "[e]xtensive
secret military operations were carried on in Laos for over five
years before Congress or the public were able to obtain any
information about them at all." 0 The executive agencies not
only withhold information but they also give out misinforma-
tion. Regarding the Vietnam War, "[w]e know that there were
secret.... The concept of the 'official secret' is the specific invention of the
bureaucracy." Schlesinger, supra note 11, at 13 (quoting Max Weber).
26. The increase in power results from diminished accountability. For
example:
That important secrets exist is carefully broadcast; only the
substance is obscure. Secrecy is a particularly effective device for
manipulating public opinion because it intimidates the uninitiated
and elicits feelings of awe and guilt. "If you only had access to the
cables, you wouldn't say the things you do," is the standard ploy....
For the public the mystique of secrecy is powerful. . . . The
managers of the Vietnam War continually pleaded with critics not to
come to the conclusions about the conflict to which ordinary
common sense was leading them because the real situation was
much more complicated. "You don't know the whole story," they
would say. Of course, that was true, as the Pentagon papers have
shown, but the vital pieces of information that were missing would
have confirmed the doubts, not allayed them.
RiCHARDJ. BARNET, ROOTS OF WAR 283-85 (1972).
27. [T]he executive branch has had a free hand in dealing with
classified information. Naturally this has made it vulnerable to its
own worst instincts .... If secrecy in some cases remains a necessity,
it also can easily become the means by which the Government
dissembles its purposes, buries its mistakes, safeguards its
reputation, manipulates its citizens, maximizes its power and
corrupts itself.
Id. at 13.
28. 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874, 14,876 (1982).
29. Schlesinger, supra note 11, at 12.
30. BARNET, supra note 27, at 268.
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huge discrepancies between what the managers of the war
learned about the basic nature of the conflict and what they
taught the public, including Congress."'" In describing Presi-
dent Reagan's approach to information, a long-time executive
branch aid said: "There was a convergence of belief of the bad
effects of too much disclosure... [and a fear that] by providing
information about what they were doing, they would provide
critics with an opportunity to shoot at them.""2 During the
passage of the Freedom of Information Act, the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations expressed concern about
the public's need for access to government- information:
A democratic society requires an informed, intelli-
gent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate var-
ies as the quantity and quality of its information
varies .... [T]he ideals of our democratic society have
outpaced the machinery which makes that society work.
The needs of the electorate have outpaced the laws which
guarantee public access to the facts in government. 33
III. CURRENT METHODS OF PUBLIC AcCESS
TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
Today, there are two main ways for the American public to
get officially nondisclosed information about its government:
the Freedom of Information Act and government leaks.
A. The Freedom of Information Act
The origin of the Freedom of Information Act dates back
to the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. As a result
of Roosevelt's New Deal legislation, the United States govern-
ment created and greatly expanded many administrative func-
31. Id. at 275. Barnet also thoroughly discusses government deception
surrounding the Vietnam War. For example:
The covert actions against Laos and North Vietnam which were
stepped up in 1963 were ostensibly for the purpose of stopping
infiltration into South Vietnam. From 1964 on the United States
publicly charged that the war was instigated and promoted by
Hanoi.... [Yet] the Special Group for Counter-Insurgency set up
by President Kennedy concluded on April 5, 1963, that "we are
unable to document and develop any hard evidence of infiltration
after October 1, 1962."
Id.
32. Lotte E. Feinberg, Managing the Freedom of Information Act and Federal
Information Policy, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 615, 618 (1986).
33. HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2418, 2429 (1966).
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tions and agencies to handle the economic disaster facing the
nation in the 1930s. As a result, administrative regulation of
private enterprise as well as most other aspects of American life
intensified. 34 Consequently, in 1946 the Presidential Commit-
tee on Administrative Management recognized the potential
for abuse inherent in the newly created executive agencies.35
As a result, the 79th Congress passed the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.3 6 The Act provided in pertinent part that "[s]ave as
otherwise required by statute, matters of official record shall in
accordance with published rule be made available to persons
properly and directly concerned except for good cause."'3 7 The
underlying motivation behind the Act was that public disclo-
sure would serve as a check on the broad powers of the new
agencies.
Under theJohnson administration in 1966, Section 3(c) of
the Administrative Procedure Act was expanded and codified,
into what is now known as the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), to "protect the right of the public to information.13 8
The legislative history of the FOIA reveals Congress' acknowl-
edgement of the public's need for information concerning its
government:
Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act in
response to a persistent problem of legislators and citi-
34. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 1937 REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, H.R. REP. No. 1980,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1195, 1195 (1946).
35. The Committee stated:
There is a conflict of principle involved in their make-up and
functions.... They are vested with duties of administration.., and
at the same time they are given important judicial work .... The
evils resulting from this confusion of principles are insidious and far
reaching .... Pressures and influences properly enough directed
toward officers responsible for formulating and administering policy
constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in which to adjudicate
private rights. But the mixed duties of the commissions render
escape from these subversive influences impossible. Furthermore,
the same men are obliged to serve both as prosecutors and as
judges. This not only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public
confidence in that fairness. Commission decisions affecting private
rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of being rationalizations
of the preliminary findings which the Commission, in the role of
prosecutor, presented to itself.
Id.
36. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404 (1946) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 1002).
37. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404(3)(c) (1946).
38. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1497,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2418, 2418 (1966).
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zens, the problem of obtaining adequate information to
evaluate federal programs and formulate wise policies.
Congress recognized that the public cannot make intelli-
gent decisions without such information, and that gov-
ernmental institutions become unresponsive to public
needs if knowledge of their activities is denied to the peo-
ple and their representatives. The touchstone of any
proceedings under the Act must be the clear legislative
intent to assure public access to all governmental records
whose disclosure would not significantly harm specific
governmental interests. The policy of the Act requires
that the disclosure requirement be construed broadly,
the exemptions narrowly.3 9
To effectuate this goal of governmental disclosure, the
FOIA requires that each agency shall make information avail-
able to the public through the Federal Register, shall make
information available for public inspection and copying, and
shall make information promptly available to any person upon
any request for records where the proper procedures have
been followed.4 °
The admirable objectives of the FOIA are simultaneously
undercut in the text of the Act itself in its list of exempted
materials. This list includes "matters that are . . . specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to
be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign pol-
icy and... are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Exec-
utive order."'" The current executive order42 allows top
executive officials to exercise unreviewable discretion in declar-
ing information secret. Consequently, all information which is
properly classified pursuant to the executive order is beyond
the scope of the FOIA. Furthermore, the Executive order pro-
vides that if an agency receives a FOIA request regarding infor-
mation which is not classified at the time of the request, the
agency may, at that time, classify the information and legally
withhold it from the requesting party. 43 Consequently, Execu-
tive order 12,356 effectively guts the FOTA of all usefulness in
the national security/foreign affairs arena.
39. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)-(3) (1988).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1988).
42. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982).
43. "Information may be classified or reclassified after an agency has
received a request for it under the Freedom of Information Act." Exec. Ord.
No. 12,356 § 1.6(d), 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 § 1.6(d) (1982).
INCREASED PRESS ACCESS
B. Government Information Leaks
The other primary method through which the public
receives officially nondisclosed information about the govern-
ment is through news leaks by government employees. The
government may leak information for any number of reasons:
to test public response to contemplated policy decisions, to
reinforce public confidence in action already taken, or even to
oppose official policy in interbranch/agency conflicts.44
Leaks are often the press' main source of information.
"The testimony of numerous members of the press, former
government officials, and others demonstrates how pervasive is
the practice of leaking."45 According to Max Frankel, then Edi-
tor of The New York Times:
[A] small and specialized corps of reporters and a few
hundred American officials regularly make use of so-
called classified, secret, and top secret information and
documentation. It is a cooperative, competitive, antago-
nistic and arcane relationship .... Without the use of
"secrets"... there could be no adequate diplomatic, mil-
itary and political reporting of the kind our people take
for granted, either abroad or in Washington and there
could be no mature system of communication between
the Government and the people.46
1. Problems with Government-Leaked Information
The problem with relying on government leaks for infor-
mation is that the public is told only that which the government
44. In an affidavit presented in connection with its court battle to
publish the Pentagon papers, the Washington Post alleged that its
reporters had been shown classified documents on numerous
occasions. This is, of course, standard procedure. The obvious
purpose is to lend credibility to a news angle which the government
is eager to promote. A reporter able to hint at "authoritative
sources" is much more likely to print the story as the government
would like to see it. However, many leaks come from sources trying
to counteract official policy rather than promote it. The military
services make liberal use of the "leak." These usually involve
"secret intelligence" about new Soviet weapons. Sometimes, they
are designed to whip up a little war fever.... But most leaks are for
the purpose of explaining or defending official policy, not
undermining it.
BARNET, supra note 27, at 290.
45. James A. Goldston et al., Note, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public
Access to Information, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 412-13 n.16 (1986).
46. Id. (quoting the affidavit of Max Frankel, Editor, The New York Times,
filed in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)).
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wants it to hear. Leaks are result-driven. Bits of information
are leaked for the purpose of furthering government goals and
not for the purpose of broadening the public's knowledge
about its government. 47 A main purpose of leaking informa-
tion is the manipulation of public opinion. This will rarely
result in details about government decisionmaking, misman-
agement, or corruption being revealed to the public. Leaks are
clearly not a reliable method for disseminating information
about the workings of the government to the public-a matter
of the utmost importance to the operation of a legitimate
democracy.
2. Government Prosecution of Leakers
In addition to "leaking" only result-driven information,
the government actively prosecutes those employees who, with-
out proper authorization, leak negative information about the
government to the public. The government has prosecuted its
employees for revealing information under breach of contract
theory,4 espionage statutes,4 9 and statutes covering theft from
the federal government.5 ° Suits against government-employed
leakers are brought selectively. The government chooses
which individuals to prosecute or sue based on the content of
the information revealed.
47. During my years in the White House it was not unusual for me
or other government officials to have photocopied or otherwise
reproduced classified documents or excerpts therefrom; to take such
documents home for review; or to quote from them, summarize
them, or otherwise utilize them in "off-the-record," "background,"
or other kinds of sessions with one or more representatives of the
news media and occasionally in speeches. No formal authority was
sought or obtained for such use, and no investigation or prosecution
ensued. On the contrary, the President, Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence and other
members of the NSC knowingly and deliberately disseminated such
information from time to time in order to advance the interests of a
particular person, policy, political party, or Department of the
Administration itself, or, in their opinion, the national interest.
Lesser officials often did the same for these reasons and others.
Id. (quoting the affidavit of Theodore C. Sorenson, filed in New York Times
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)).
48. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
49. See United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (D. Md. 1985), appeal
dismissed, 774 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
50. Id.
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United States v. Morison5 1 marked the first time the govern-
ment successfully prosecuted a person not accused of being a
spy under the Espionage Act.52 Samuel L. Morison worked at a
Naval Intelligence Support Center as a security-cleared ana-
lyst. 53 He leaked classified satellite photographs of a Soviet
nuclear-powered carrier under construction 54 to a British pub-
lication.55 The United States District Court found Morison
guilty of violating the Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. § 793(d)) by
willfully transmitting photographs, allegedly related to the
national defense, to a person not entitled to receive them.56
The court also found him guilty of "theft or conversion of
those same . . . photographs, in violation of [the theft statute]
18 U.S.C. § 641." 57
In his defense, Morison argued that the Espionage Act was
intended by its drafters to cover what most people would con-
sider classic espionage cases "where the disclosure is to an
agent of a foreign government" 58 and that the statute was
therefore "not properly applied to a 'leak' case."' 59 However,
the court concentrated on a literal interpretation of the stat-
ute.6 ° The Espionage Act provides that:
Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, con-
trol over, or being entrusted with any ... photograph...
relating to the national defense which information the
possessor has reason to believe could be used to the
injury of the United States... willfully.., transmits...
the same to any person not entitled to receive it ... Shall
be [fined or imprisoned or both]. 6 '
51. 604 F. Supp. 655 (D. Md. 1985), appeal dismissed, 774 F.2d 1156 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (1988).
53. STEPHEN DYcuS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 675 (1990).
54. Id.
55. The name of the publication wasJane's Defense Weekly.
56. Morison, 604 F. Supp. at 657.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 660.
59. Id. at 658.
60. Id. at 660.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (1988). The full text of this section is as follows:
Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or
being entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book,
sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map,
model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national
defense, or information relating to the national defense which
information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation,
willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be
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The court stated that "to read into the statute the requirement
that it apply only in 'classic espionage' cases where the disclo-
sure is to an agent of a foreign government would be to ignore
the plain language of the law as presently written. "62
With respect to the count regarding theft, Morison argued
that 18 U.S.C. § 64163 was not meant to apply to unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.64 He asserted that "no
definitive court test of the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 641 to
unauthorized disclosures of classified information ' 65 has yet
been made. The court conceded this point but noted that
"other district courts have allowed prosecution under § 641 for
similar conduct" 66 and permitted it to be applied in his case.
Since Morison opened the door to the application of § 641
to unauthorized disclosures of government information, the
issue now is not "may these statutes be used by the government
against leakers?" but "in what manner is the government exercis-
ing its discretion to prosecute such leakers?" Morison
contended
that using § 641 to regulate the disclosure of government
information gives executive branch officials unbridled
communicated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts to
communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated,
delivered or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to
receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on
demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to
receive it .. .Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years or both.
62. Morison, 604 F. Supp. at 660. Morison also claimed that Section
793(d) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Both allegations were
rejected by the Court. Id. at 659, 662.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988) states:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to
his use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or
disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the
United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any
property made or being made under contract for the United States
or any department of agency thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to
convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled,
stolen, purloined or converted-Shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the
value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100, he shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both.
The word "value" means face, par, or market value, or cost
price, either wholesale or retail, whichever is greater.
64. Morison, 604 F. Supp. at 660.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 664.
INCREASED PRESS ACCESS
discretion to enforce the statute and thereby control the
flow of government information to the public. Thus,
government officials would be free to enforce the statute
and thereby control the flow of government information
to the public. Thus, government officials would be free
to enforce their own information control policy, and lia-
bility may turn on nothing more than the fact that the
disclosure embarasses [sic] them or subjects them to pub-
lic criticism.6 7
To this the court briefly replied: "These arguments have
little to do with this case."6 In reality, these arguments are
central to the larger issue: government abuse of the classifica-
tion process which undermines the public's knowledge about
government information. By allowing the government to
enforce selectively these statutes, Morison's point was exactly
on target.
In addition to prosecuting cases based on the espionage
and federal theft statutes, the government also employs con-
tractual restraints against its employees to deal with what it
considers to be unfavorable information leaks. Like the federal
theft and espionage statutes, suits brought against employees
under a contract theory of law are also pursued with a great
deal of discretion based upon the content of the information.
United States v. Marchetti69 and Snepp v. United States7o are the
two landmark cases which illustrate this contract approach.
Government employees whose positions provide access to
privileged or classified information are required to enter into a
secrecy agreement upon the commencement and termination
of their employment. This agreement generally states that they
will not divulge information to which they were exposed as a
result of their secured status without first seeking and receiving
prepublication approval from the proper officials. 7 '
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
70. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
71. An example of part of one such secrecy agreement is the oath
Victor L. Marchetti took upon the termination of his employment with the
Central Intelligence Agency.
I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL
RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE
ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS: 1. I will never divulge,
publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any
information relating to the national defense and security and
particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence
sources, methods and operations, and specifically Central
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The first of the two cases, United States v. Marchetti,
addresses the constitutionality, as well as the propriety, of the
secrecy agreement itself. Victor L. Marchetti, a former
employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), attempted
to publish a manuscript in violation of the secrecy oath he took
as a condition of his employment with the CIA.7 2 The Central
Intelligence Agency sought to enjoin him from publishing this
information on the ground that such publication would be in
violation of the secrecy agreement which existed between
Marchetti and the CIA. The Fourth Circuit granted the injunc-
tion and ruled that the secrecy oath was contractual, "constitu-
tional and otherwise reasonable and lawful.""3 The court
based its decision on the government's right to and need for
secrecy and the practical utility of the contractual arrangement
to assure that secrecy."
Although courts have traditionally applied a very high level
of judicial scrutiny to laws which adversely affect First Amend-
ment rights, the Marchetti court avoided applying such scrutiny
by focusing instead on the executive origin of the secrecy
agreement. The court made the initial observation that the
First Amendment was directed solely at Congress: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press."75 By concentrating on the amendment's specific
mention of Congress, the court reasoned that such exacting
scrutiny need only be used in analyzing Congressional action
impinging upon freedom of speech or the press.
Intelligence Agency operations, sources, methods, personnel, fiscal
data, or security measures to anyone, including but not limited to,
any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or
other Government employee or official without the express written
consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized
representative.
Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1312.
72. Id. at 1311.
73. Id.
74. Citizens have the right to criticize the conduct of our foreign
affairs, but the Government also has the right and the duty to strive
for internal secrecy about the conduct of governmental affairs in
areas in which disclosure may reasonable be thought to be
inconsistent with the national interest. . . . Moreover, the
Government's need for secrecy in this area lends justification to a
system of prior restraint against disclosure by employees and former
employees of classified information obtained during the course of
employment.
Id. at 1315-17.
75. Id. at 1313 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
INCREASED PRESS ACCESS
The court's analysis did go a step further, however, and
recognized that "[in order to protect freedom of speech and of
the press, the First Amendment has been applied beyond its
express terms" '76 by the Supreme Court to apply to the execu-
tive and judicial branches of government as well. "In applying
the First Amendment to actions taken by the judicial and exec-
utive branches, the Supreme Court has followed a flexible
approach.""' Marchetti then used this "flexible" approach and
concluded that the overwhelming importance of national secur-
ity and effective government operation justified the secrecy
agreement's infringement upon a federal employee's freedom
.of speech. "This flexible approach toward the executive and
judicial branch is warranted not only because they are omitted
from the express language of the First Amendment, but also
because they lack legislative capacity to establish a pervasive
system of censorship." 7 Marchetti did not recognize that this
particular method of censorship may be equally, if not more,
pervasive than a law passed by Congress because the oaths
restrict the flow of information at its source-since the persons
being censored are government insiders, the public's access to
government information is cut off. Censorship of government
officials without an alternative system of information dissemi-
nation restricts the public's access to essential facts about the
operation and processes of government.
Marchetti restricted its holding to secret information touch-
ing upon the national defense and the conduct of foreign
affairs. The court stated:
We readily agree with Marchetti that the First Amend-
ment limits the extent to which the United States, con-
tractually or otherwise, may impose secrecy requirements
upon its employees and enforce them with a system of
prior censorship. It precludes such restraints with
respect to information which is unclassified or officially
disclosed, but we are here concerned with secret informa-
tion touching upon the national defense and the conduct
of foreign affairs .... 79
In Snepp v. United States,8 ° the Supreme Court took a step
beyond Marchetti and held that secrecy agreements apply to the
disclosure of both classified and unclassified information
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1314.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1313.
80. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
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alike. 8 ' Snepp, a former CIA agent, also entered a secrecy
agreement as an express condition of his employment with the
Agency. After his career with the CIA, he published a book8 2
based on his exposure to CIA activities in South Vietnam.83
The Agency sued Snepp for not submitting this book to the
Agency for prepublication review, as required by his secrecy
agreement-even though the CIA conceded that Snepp's book
disclosed no classified information.
The Court primarily concentrated on the relationship
Snepp established with the Central Intelligence Agency by tak-
ing the secrecy oath. The Court referred to this arrangement
as a "trust agreement."8 4 Through its emphasis on the nature
of the agreement, the substance of the information sought to
be published became immaterial.
Snepp's employment with the CIA involved an extremely
high degree of trust. In the opening sentence of the
agreement that he signed, Snepp explicitly recognized
that he was entering a trust relationship. The trust agree-
ment specifically imposed the obligation not to publish
any information relating to the Agency without submit-
ting the information for clearance .... Whether Snepp
violated his trust does not depend upon whether his book
actually contained classified information .... The Gov-
ernment simply claims that, in light of the special trust
reposed in him and the agreement that he signed, Snepp
should have given the CIA an opportunity to determine
whether the material he proposed to publish would com-
promise classified information or sources.8 5
The Court stated: "[u]ndisputed evidence in this case shows
that a CIA agent's violation of his obligation to submit writings
about the Agency for prepublication review impairs the CIA's
ability to perform its statutory duties."8 6 This statement is
undeniably true. If each agent made independent decisions as
81. Id. at 511.
82. FRANK SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL: AN INSIDER'S AccouNT OF
SAIGON'S INDECENT END (1977).
83. 444 U.S. 507, 507 (1980).
84. Id. at 510.
85. Id. at 510-11. The Court also pointed out that the character of his
position with the CIA could of itself establish a trust relationship. "Quite
apart from the plain language of the agreement, the nature of Snepp's duties
and his conceded access to confidential sources and materials could establish
a trust relationship .... Few types of governmental employment involve a
higher degree of trust than that reposed in a CIA employee with Snepp's
duties." Id. at 511 n.6.
86. Id. at 512.
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to what secret information the public should know, national
security would, in fact, be severely threatened.87 However, in
the absence of any other vehicle to disseminate information,
such "unauthorized" disclosures will undoubtedly continue in
the future.
IV. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
The possibility that the government will use the espionage
and theft statutes and contract law to censor the dissemination
of what it considers to be "unfavorable" information has been
recognized by the Supreme Court.
This Court has recognized that the lodging of such broad
discretion in a public official allows him to determine
which expressions of view will be permitted and which
will not. This thus sanctions a device for the suppression
of the communication of ideas and permits the official to
act as a censor.... It is clearly unconstitutional to enable
a public official to determine which expressions of view
will be permitted and which will not or to engage in
invidious discrimination among persons or groups either
by use of a statute providing a system of broad discre-
tionary power or, as in this case, the equivalent of such a
system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad
statute.
88
The larger problem lies in the classification system itself.
If "the system" incorporated methods and procedures for sys-
tematic review and declassification of information with the spe-
cific purpose of broadening public knowledge, then
government employees, in their individual capacities, would
probably be less inclined to break their secrecy agreements and
disseminate information they believe is vital to public discus-
sion. Government employees who leak information without
87. When a former agent relies on his own judgment about what
information is detrimental, he may reveal information that the
CIA-with its broader understanding of what may expose classified
information and confidential sources-could have identified as
harmful. In addition to receiving intelligence from domestically
based or controlled sources, the CIA obtains information from the
intelligence services of friendly nations and from agents operating in
foreign countries. The continued availability of these foreign
sources depends upon the CIA's ability to guarantee the security of
information that might compromise them and even endanger the
personal safety of foreign agents.
Id.
88. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965).
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authorization should be prosecuted-there must be a way to
enforce the agreements. However, this should be true only
where other outlets for declassifying information exist.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has
addressed this crisis regarding classified information.8 9 In
denying a claim by a former CIA agent who sought a declara-
tory judgment that CIA classification and censorship violated
the first amendment, the court stated:
It would of course be extremely difficult for judges to
"balance" the public's right to know against an acknowl-
edged national security risk, and I do not believe we are
currently authorized to do so. However, it seems impor-
tant in view of recent revelations about past indiscretions
in the name of national security, for some governmental
institution, if not the classification system itself, to con-
duct such a balance .... Economic and criminal sanc-
tions against agents who violate the preclearance and
agency classification scheme are justifiable. But with no
mechanism in the system for balancing the public's right
to know with possible risks to security, those sanctions
can also result in the permanent loss of information criti-
cal to public debate.9 0
The classification system is clearly in need of reform. A
delicate balance must be struck to maintain these two vital
functions of the nation: keeping the democratic process viable
through meaningful public debate, and maintaining the safety
of the very institutions which give life to that democracy.
To reform the present classification system, change must
be initiated by one of the three branches of government. It is
highly doubtful that reform of the classification system will
come from within the executive. As mentioned earlier, the
executive bureaucracy will not voluntarily elect to lessen its
own power and influence through large-scale declassification of
information."
Neither is the judiciary a likely place to look for aid to the
problems with the classification system. The courts, having no
training in, experience with, or inside knowledge of national
security issues, have exercised prudent self-restraint in this
area. In examining denied FOIA requests and prosecutions
against those who leak "unfavorable" information, courts have
89. McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
90. Id. at 1150.
91. See supra notes 26 and 28.
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consistently deferred to the executive on national security
issues.
For example, in McGehee v. Casey92 the appellant sought a
declaratory judgment that the CIA classification and censorship
scheme violated the First Amendment and that an article he
desired to have published contained no properly classified
material. The court stated:
[C]ourts are to "accord substantial weight to an agency's
affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of
the disputed record" because "the Executive depart-
ments responsible for national defense and foreign policy
matters have unique insights into what adverse [e]ffects
might occur as a result of a particular classified
record."93
Additionally, in Epstein v. Resor,94 the Ninth Circuit
addressed the issue ofjudicial participation in national security
matters.
[This court] recognizes the proposition that the question
of what is desirable in the interest of national defense and
foreign policy is not the sort of question that courts are
designed to deal with. As has been stated, the judiciary
has neither the 'aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility' to
review these essentially political decisions.9
5
In United States v. Marchetti,96 Chief Judge Haynsworth wrote
that the operations of the CIA are generally "an executive func-
92. 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
93. Id. at 1148 (quoting SENATE REP. ON THE FOIA AMENDMENTS, S.
Rep. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6267, 6290 (Conference Report on the FOIA Amendments)).
In 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
denied a FOIA inquiry seeking information on the CIA's relationship with
California state colleges. Regarding the role of the judiciary when reviewing
FOIA requests for classified information, the court wrote:
The test is not whether the court personally agrees in full with the
CIA's evaluation of the danger-rather, the issue is whether on the
whole record the Agency's judgment objectively survives the test of
reasonableness, good faith, specificity, and plausibility in this field of
foreign intelligence in which the CIA is expert and given by
Congress a special role.
Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
94. 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
95. Id. at 933. The court also pointed out that "[t]he function of
determining whether secrecy is required in the national interest is expressly
assigned to the executive. The judicial inquiry is limited to the question
whether an appropriate executive order has been made as to the material in
question." Id.
96. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
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tion beyond the control of the judicial power [and i]f in the
conduct of its operations the need for secrecy requires a system
of classification of documents and information, the process of
classification is part of the executive function beyond the scope
of judicial review." 97
Due to the executive's reluctance and the judiciary's self-
proclaimed inability to reform or review the classification pro-
cess, change must come from the legislature. Congressional
action is needed to reform the present classification system and
to install mechanisms which systematically declassify massive
amounts of information-while remaining sensitive to national
security and foreign affairs interests. The Supreme Court has
declared that Congress may legislate in the area of national
security affairs, with the only restriction being that it not pre-
vent the President "from accomplishing [his] constitutionally
assigned functions. ' 98
Under the present executive order, items of information
are reviewed for declassification by the Archivist of the United
States after being submitted into the National Archives,9 9 or
upon the election of agency heads' 00 -a highly unlikely event.
In addition to these two instances, classified information is sub-
ject to mandatory review for declassification upon the govern-
ment's receipt of a procedurally correct request to do so from a
United States citizen or permanent resident alien, federal
agency, or State or local government.'
97. Id. at 1317.
98. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 484
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
695 (1988) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425,
443 (1977))). In Public Citizen, the Supreme Court maintained that where
Congress enters the realm of traditionally executive powers, a balancing test
is applied.
In some of our more recent cases involving the powers and
prerogatives of the President, we have employed something of a
balancing approach, asking whether the statute at issue prevents the
President "from accomplishing [his] constitutionally assigned
functions," and whether the extent of intrusion on the President's
powers "is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives
within the constitutional authority of Congress." In each of these
cases, the power at issue was not to be within the sole province of
the President, but rather was thought to be encompassed within the
general grant to the president of the "executive Power."
Id. (citations omitted).
99. Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 3.3(a), 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982).
100. Id. at § 3.3(b)-(c).
101. Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 3.4(a)(1), (2), 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874
(1982). The text of the relevant section provides:
(a) Except as provided in Section 3.4(b), all information classified
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These methods are wholly inadequate. Due to the sheer
mass of information involved, only a very small fraction of clas-
sified information is subject to declassification requests each
year. For example, in 1984 alone the government made more
than 19.6 million decisions to classify information.10 2
A. Proposals for Reform
While recognizing that some information simply must be
kept confidential by the government, both the beginning and
ending of the classification process should be modified to cut
back on the potential for abusing the system. The types of
information which may be classified should be reduced, and a
systematic procedure for declassifying information should be
instituted-thereby minimizing the amount of information
initially classified, and speeding along the release of that
information.
Presently, there are three levels at which information may
be classified: confidential, secret, and top secret.10 3 One way
to minimize the amount of information being classified is to
limit the possible categories. The "confidential" category of
classified information could be dropped altogether. Informa-
tion is classified as confidential when its unauthorized disclo-
sure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the
national security.'1 4 The potential for damage to national
security is low for this category. The imperative for informed
public debate is so crucial to democracy that it outweighs the
potential harm the information's unauthorized disclosure may
have on the national security. On balance, the possibility that
information reasonably could be expected to cause damage to
the national security does not justify the extent to which public
debate would be stifled by its nondisclosure. While not classi-
fying such information may sometimes lead to mere "damage"
under this Order or predecessor orders shall be subject to a
review for declassification by the originating agency, if:
(1) the request is made by a United States citizen or permanent
resident alien, a federal agency, or a State or local
government; and
(2) the request describes the document or material containing
the information with sufficient specificity to enable the
agency to locate it with a reasonable amount of effort.
102. James A. Goldston et al., Note, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished
Public Access to Information, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 484 (1986) (citing
the Annual Report to the President, FY1984, Information Security Oversight
Office 11 (Apr. 26, 1985)).
103. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982).
104. Id.
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to the national security (as opposed to "serious damage" or
"exceptionally grave damage" as is the case for "secret" or
"top secret" information, respectively), the public loss of faith
in government (due to its perception of the government's unac-
countability) and the harm to the democratic process is con-
ceivably worse. In the Pentagon Papers case Justice Black stated
that "[t]he guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the
expense of informed representative government provides no
real security for our Republic.""' 5 Justice Stewart elaborated:
In the absence of the governmental checks and bal-
ances present in other areas of our national life, the only
effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the
areas of national defense and international affairs may lie
in an enlightened citizenry-in an informed and critical
public opinion which alone can here protect the values of
democratic government.' 0 6
In addition to limiting the types of information which may
be initially classified, the other side of the spectrum-declassifi-
cation-should be loosened to open more information up to
public scrutiny. Mandatory, specified declassification time peri-
ods should be established. All classified materials should be
automatically, declassified in either three or five years after the
date of their original classification. The government, however,
may extend the classified status of a piece of information for
another classification period. To do so, upon the declassifica-
tion date, the government would have the burden of showing
to the Oversight Committee, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the information still meets one of the requisite
levels of sensitivity to be classified.
Under this scheme, inertia would be on the side of declas-
sification instead of the other way around. If no action is taken
by an agency, the information is declassified-unlike today's
system which requires that affirmative steps be taken by the
government to declassify. Since finite resources would be
available for this purpose, considering time and money con-
straints, the government would be forced to choose to classify
only that information it deems most sensitive-thereby
allowing vast amounts of classified information to be available
to the public.
Also in this proposed scheme, classified information may
be subject to release prior to its declassification date if it is the
105. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971) (per
curiam) (Black, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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subject of a FOIA request. When access to information is
sought through the FOIA, the government must offer a written
justification for withholding the document from the requesting
party. In this justification, the reasons for the document's orig-
inal classification should be restated; and the information may
only be withheld to the extent that those reasons are still via-
ble. If the requesting party contests the justification, the dis-
pute shall be presented to the Oversight Committee.
The Oversight Committee would be composed of individ-
uals chosen from outside the government "who are qualified
on the basis of achievement, experience and independence."' 0 7
To keep this system itself from being a source of government
leaks, the committee members should be required to "execute
an agreement never to reveal any classified information
obtained by virtue of his or her service 'with the committee
except to the President, . . . such persons-as the President may
designate, ' ' ° or to a person statutorily designated to receive
information within the parameters of carrying out the commit-
tee's proper functions. The use of secrecy agreements
throughout the executive branch and intelligence agencies
would now be justified since other outlets would exist within
the system for declassifying information.
The members of the Oversight Committee should be cho-
sen by the President and ratified by Congress. The Commit-
tee's duties would include overseeing and monitoring the
classification and declassification procedures of the various
executive agencies. Upon discovery of potential classification
illegalities, the Committee should submit such information to
the President and the Attorney General for review and ruling.
If within a reasonable amount of time (perhaps sixty days) the
Committee finds that the problem has not been seriously
addressed and no ruling has been issued with regard to the
alleged illegalities, the Committee shall then be permitted to
submit this information to the appropriate Congressional com-
mittee for review: for example, the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence or the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. 1"9 This threat of having information revealed to
Congress would, hopefully, motivate the President and Attor-
ney General to take quick action on the classification dispute in
107. Exec. Order No. 12,334 § 1, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,955 (1981), amended
by Exec. Order No. 12,701, 55 Fed. Reg. 5,953 (1990). The proposed
oversight committee is based in part on the President's Intelligence
Oversight Board.
108. Id. at § 5.
109. These committees are described in 50 U.S.C. § 413 (1988).
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order to keep the information away from the congressional
committees.
B. Legislative Proposal
National security information properly classified as
"Secret" and "Top Secret" shall be subject to mandatory
declassification in three (3) and five (5) years, respec-
tively, after the date of original classification, subject to
the following exceptions:
(a) the declassification period for national security infor-
mation may be extended beyond the prescribed three
or five year period if, upon the declassification date,
the original classifying entity makes a showing that
such disclosure reasonably could be expected to
cause serious damage to the national security; or
(b) the declassification period may be shortened when
classified information is the subject of a Freedom of
Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) request within its
prescribed three or five year classification period.
Upon such a request, the classifying entity must show
that the facts which justified the original classification
are still viable. Otherwise, the information shall be
made available to the requesting party and the
public.
CONCLUSION
By raising the hurdle over which information must pass to
be classified, less information will be classified. Only informa-
tion, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably poses a
threat of serious damage to the national security, should be
kept from the public. Additionally, subject to the government's
option to attempt to renew the classification period, informa-
tion which is properly kept from the public should be declassi-
fied automatically upon the expiration of its predetermined
declassification date. If the declassification scheme works
properly, information will be made available to the public more
efficiently and on a much larger scale, without compromising
the secrecy of information which is legitimately sensitive.
